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Copyright law, by virtue of its protection of intellectual capital
and especially particular forms of expression, is in a constant state of
flux.' Technological advances in two disparate areas continue to re-
define copyright law while maintaining the crucial balance between
the rights of copyright owners and those of users. One area of tech-
nological growth is that of reproduction and dissemination technol-
ogy. Copyright law must acknowledge and conform to changes in
the way we make and distribute copies of works and the ease with
which this is accomplished.2 Whether it be the printing press or the
photocopier, videocassette recorders or digital audio tape recorders,
copyright law must respond to technological advancements by pro-
tecting the copyright holders' interest in their creations while allow-
* Copyright © 1996 Sean R. Calvert.
t Sean R. Calvert, J.D. May, 1997 with high tech certificate. The author would like to
thank Professor Howard Anawalt for his thoughtful comments and criticism of this article.
This work is dedicated to the author's father for his support and emphasis on intellectual curi-
osity.
1. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,430 (1984).
2. INoPqrl-oN INFRAsTucruRE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL
INFOntATION INFRASTRuCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIorrs 7 (1995) [hereinafter WVHrE PAPER].
546 COMPUTERIHGHTECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 13
ing users to benefit from new technology.3
One other force shaping copyright law is the development of
new media for the expression of authorship. When Congress enacted
the 1909 version of the Copyright Act,4 enjoying dramatic works in
the privacy of one's home, without great effort or expense, was in-
conceivable. The advent of the VCR has made in-home enjoyment of
dramatic performances common. The widespread availability of
these new media has forced the law to adapt in order to maintain the
balance between the rights of authors and the public. That adaptation
is crucial to copyright law. The same is true of the music recording
industry. Digital audio tapes and compact disks have made it possi-
ble to listen to an almost exact duplication of a full orchestra while
sitting in our living rooms without the inconvenience of actually
building an orchestra pit next to the couch.
We are presently poised for yet another monumental change in
the structure of copyright law. The proliferation of digital technol-
ogy, particularly the creation of linked data networks spanning the
world, has created a fertile environment for the quick and easy repro-
duction and distribution of a work to millions all over the world.' In
response to this challenge, the Working Group on Intellectual Prop-
erty of the Information Infrastructure Task Force (Working Group)
has released a set of proposed changes to the Copyright Act in an at-
tempt to adapt copyright law to this new technology. The report
(White Paper) suggests several changes to the Copyright Act.
The minor changes to the Copyright Act proposed by the White
Paper may be the most troubling. The shift that is presently under-
way is fundamental to the means of producing, duplicating, and
transmitting copyrightable works.6 The White Paper's reliance on
minor alterations to the Act severely underestimates the scope of this
shift. It further ignores the present tension in copyright law by sin-
gle-mindedly citing to only the cases supporting its view of where
copyright should be.7 The White Paper ignores contrary authority
3. Marybeth Peters, The Spring 1996 Horace S. Manges Lecture - The National In.
fromation Infrastructure: A Copyright Office Perspective, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 341
(1996).
4. The latest version of the Copyright Act became effective on January 1, 1978. See 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1010 (West Supp. 1996).
5. WirrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 12.
6. Peters, supra note 3, at 341 (noting that the present stress on the Copyright Act is
nothing new and that the emergence of new technologies over the past fifty years has
"magically transform[ed] our lives").
7. Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CAnnozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 29, 32
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and often cites cases for only that portion of the holding it wishes to
use.8 This approach has resulted in a report lacking serious analysis
of the policy behind the Copyright Act.
The Constitution of the United States confers upon Congress the
power to "promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."9 It is from this
clause that copyright protection flows. Congress enacted the Copy-
right Act to promote useful arts and sciences by securing for the life-
time of the author plus fifty years several exclusive rights with regard
to their writings. These rights exist as an incentive to create and fur-
ther the arts.1 Thus, while the Constitution calls for exclusive rights
to be granted to the author, those rights only exist to the extent they
are necessary as an economic incentive for creation." There is no
basis in the Constitution for authors to have complete control over
the works they create.12
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the
terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that
the author has in his writings. ... but upon the ground that the
welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and
useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited pe-
riods the exclusive rights to their writings.13
It is clear from the language above that the interest in protecting
the rights of authors is secondary to the interest in maintaining public
access to creative works. This is the basis of the balancing test inher-
ent in copyright. 4 There must be rights sufficient to provide an in-
centive to create new works but not to an extent that hinders access to
the works.
The Working Group's one-sided approach leads to an interpre-
tation of precedent that supports the conclusion that copyright law
protects a copyright owner's interests in digital works. For the most
part, the cases that were the basis of the Working Group's report
(1994).
8. In particular note the Working Group's reading of Sony v. Universal City Studios,
discussed later with regard to fair use. See infra Part IIl.
9. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. S.
10. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953); MELViLLE B. NimMMR & DAvID NMMER, 1
NIMMERtON CoPYRIGr § 1.03 [A] (1995) [hereinafter NIMMER].
11. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 201; LEON E. SELTZER, EXEDMPIONS AND FAIR USE IN
coPYRIGrr 8 (1978).
12. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,428 (1984).
13. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
14. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 429.
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concerned nondigital media. The blanket application of the decisions
in these cases to a wholly different medium is questionable at best.
The expansive reading the Working Group applies to these cases ig-
nores the balance that courts have consistently tried to maintain be-
tween the rights of copyright owners and users. 5 Because the seem-
ingly minor changes to copyright law that the Working Group
suggests derive from the Working Group's reinterpretations of estab-
lished law, the changes could shift the balance basic to the Copyright
Act severely in favor of copyright owners.
This note discusses whether it is possible to adopt the minor
changes suggested by the Working Group and broaden the scope of
copyright protection to cover digital works while maintaining the
balance necessary to permit public access and use.
This note will address four areas of the Working Group's analy-
sis. Part I discusses the need for protection of intellectual property in
digital environments both for copyright owners and for users. Part II
addresses the Working Group's suggested creation of a new digital
transmission right in light of its reading of existing case law. Part III
discusses the implications for the fair use doctrine of the Working
Group's reading of selected cases. Part IV is an analysis of the first
sale doctrine for digital works in the wake of the White Paper. Part V
suggests some technological solutions for the on-line service provider
dilemma. Finally, Part VI considers the aftermath of the White Paper
and the resultant congressional and international debate concerning
application of its recommendations, Part VI concludes with how the
suggestions of the Working Group will affect copyright law.
I. THE NEED FOR PROTECTION OF DIGITAL WORKS
The exponential growth of the Internet during the past decade 16
provides copyright owners with an unprecedented opportunity to fun-
damentally alter the way they market their works. Foreseeing its po-
tential, several companies have begun to conduct business over the
Internet. 17 Undoubtedly,- the number of companies doing business
over the Internet will continue to grow.
15. Id.
16. Several recent cases comment on this growth. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom
On-Line Comm. Svcs., Inc., 923 F. Supp 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995), MTV Networks v. Curry, 867
F. Supp. 202 ($.D.N.Y. 1994). See also Peoplebank: Netyourselfajob!, M2 PPsswIRE, Feb.
13, 1996; World Wide Web Could Be Threat To On-line Services, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL,
Feb.26, 1996.
17. Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Internet Payment Systems and the Cybercash Approach,
452 PLI/PAT 123, 126-27 (1996).
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Some companies have developed Internet sites through which
customers can order the company's product via electronic mail.18
The company either bills the customer or takes the customer's credit
card number in encrypted form on-line.' 9 Once the payment is set-
tled, the company ships the product." This is a mixed approach be-
cause it places the company on the Internet but does not treat the In-
ternet as its major avenue of sales. Of course, for some companies,
primarily those with a physical product, this is the only way to do
business on the Internet.2' Other companies are realizing the amazing
potential of the Internet for decreasing or eliminating the costs asso-
ciated with maintaining resellers, warehouses and other, more tradi-
tional modes of distribution.22 This bolder strategy accepts the risks
of uncertainty that come with doing business on the Internet, with the
chance to multiply one's returns? 3
For companies that sell digitized products, the Internet offers a
distribution system without the typical costs.24 A minimal invest-
ment allows a company to set up a site on the Internet,' usually a
page on the World Wide Web,26 and sell their product directly from
that site. This eliminates almost all the per unit costs associated with
product distribution.27 There is no longer the need for warehouses or
for networks of wholesalers and retailers.28 The per unit cost for this
method is almost nil.
Because the reproduction of digital works can be quick and
easy,29 companies can respond to customer demand instantaneously,
without the costs of increasing and improving the production of a
physical product.30 Coupled with a practically free distribution net-
18. Id. at 138.
19. Id
20. Id
21. Craig W. Harding, Trends in Electronic Commerce: Doing Business Over the Inter-
net, 452 PLI/PAr 509, 513 (1996).
22. Id
23. Id
24. Stevenson, supra note 17, at 128.
25. Paul Rosenberg, Shifting Avenues of Distribution, CAN. Bus., Sept. 1, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 9040910.
26. IBM's Gestner Networked Future, TRAuic WoRLD, Dec. 23, 1996, at 45, available in
1996 WL 8355404..
27. Stevenson, supra note 17, at 128.
28. Id.
29. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 11.
30. Id. at 9.
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work, per unit cost drops considerably.3 1 In all probability, the cost
savings in doing business over the National Information Infrastruc-
ture (NII) will eventually shift the way most companies do business
away from a physical distribution model and toward some method of
digital distribution. 2 The ability to reach consumers at home or at
work will also drive companies unable to take advantage of the digi-
tal economies, due to the physical nature of their product, to establish
some presence on the Internet.
Obstacles exist, however, that may prevent this shift from occur-
ring. One of the most important problems is how to protect the
dealings between a company and its customers.3 A concern of al-
most as much importance is the protection afforded a company's
product. 4 Companies will likely delay turning to the Internet until
they can be confident that works are equally protected when trans-
mitted digitally as when they are distributed physically.35 While the
benefits to a company which switches to the Internet are enormous,
the risks the switch entails are potentially overwhelming. With no
protection for the distribution of digital works, except in contract,
there is a strong probability that illicit copies of its product will re-
duce the company's market share.3 6 This, combined with the present
questions about the enforceability of electronic adhesion contracts,37
presents a company interested in doing business over the Internet
with a severe problem. A further concern is that the digital nature of
the work makes it almost impossible, under the present scheme, to
ensure that copies distributed by a third party have the same quality
as the original. 38 Thus, a company's market share could be adversely
affected by illicit copies.
Aware of these concerns, 39 the Working Group attempts to alter
the Copyright Act to protect digital works from the potential hazards.
3 1. Stevenson, supra note 17, at 127.
32. Id. at 123.
33. From Wire Reports, Net Security is a Real Issue with Companies, SAN Disco UNION-
TatB., May 14, 1996, at 17, 18.
34. W'Mm PAPER, supra note 2, at 10.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 89 F.3d 1257 (7th Cir. 1996). Many of these uncertain-
ties should be resolved with the publication of the Uniform Commercial Code § 2B.
38. One of the benefits of digital works is that the copy is of the same quality as the
original. Because of the malleability of digital works, however, there exists the potential for a
third party to alter an original work and then post it to the Internet. The resulting altered work
can have severe consequences for the author of the original work.
39. Wrra PAPER, supra note 2, at 10.
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In that respect, the alterations proposed in the White Paper are
laudatory. The proposed changes go well beyond correcting for the
risks associated with digital works, however, and consequently con-
vey a patent like monopoly over the works.40 This unfortunate out-
come reflects an incorrect reading of the scope of copyright law. It
results from the Working Group's reliance on questionable precedent
which allows substantial changes in copyright law without reforming
the Copyright Act.
11. THE TRANSMISSION RIGHT
The Working Group relies heavily on a line of cases, starting
with MA! Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer (.MA), 41 which held that
loading a work into the random access memory (RAM)42 of a com-
puter creates a copy sufficiently fixed to violate the reproduction
right.43 All the cases cited by the Working Group further rely on the
Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU Report)' for their conclusions
regarding the fixation of a work in RAM. Reliance on the CONTU
Report may be misplaced as there is almost no legislative history
with regards to Congress's adoption of the report's recommenda-
tions.45  On the other hand, two years prior to the release of the
40. See Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable
Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1 J. INTEL. PROP. L. 49,
56-57 (1993) (discussing how limiting the scope of copyright protection furthers the societal
purposes of copyright law by preventing the recognition of broad rights in publishers or
authors, and stating that "the ultimate purpose of copyright is not the maximization of financial
rewards to copyright").
41. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
42. RAM refers to both dynamic and static RAM although there may be differences in
how one should treat them under a MAI analysis.
43. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Advanced Computer Serv. v. MAI
Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.,
1994 WL 446049 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Of particular concern to the viability of the Internet is
Sega Enters. Ltd, v. MAPHIA, 1996 WL 734409 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (applying the MAI rule to
browsing or caching of files from a bulletin board service).
44. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d at 260; Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeast-
em Express Co., 1994 WL 446049 at *4; NATIONAL COmMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIomED VoRKs, FINAL REPORT (1978).
45. The only legislative history with regard to Congress's acceptance of the rule that
loading of a work into the memory of a computer is contained in a short paragraph in a com-
mittee report, which merely states that the Act "embodies the recommendations of [the
CONTU.] with respect to clarifying the law of copyright of computer software." H.R. REP. No.
96-1307, pt. 1, at 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
1307].
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CONTU Report, Congress made it clear that works are not suffi-
ciently fixed if they are "purely evanescent or transient" in nature,
"such as those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on
a television or cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the
'memory' of a computer."" The decisions cited by the Working
Group relied on this blanket adoption of the CONTU Report despite
specific Congressional language to the contrary.
The decisions cited by the Working Group also overemphasize
the verbiage in the definition of "fixed" in § 101 of the Copyright
Act.
[B]y showing that Peak loads the software into the RAM and is
then able to view the system error log and diagnose the problem
with the computer, MAI has adequately shown that the representa-
tion created in the RAM is "sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration."47
Once a software program is loaded into a computer's RAM, useful
representations of the program's information or intelligence can be
displayed on a video screen or printed out on a printer. And this
can be done virtually instantaneously once loading is completed.
Given this, it is apparent that a software program residing in RAM
is "stable enough to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than transitory duration."48
While the courts in both instances were correct to look to the
wording of the statute to determine whether loading a work into
RAM constitutes creation of a copy, there are several strong argu-
ments against such a simple application. 49 Aside from Congress's
statement that loading a digital work into RAM does not meet the
46. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47, 53 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666-67
[hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1476].
47. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,518 (9th Cir. 1993).
48. Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va.
1994).
49. This note does not addresses the possibility of using § 117 to solve this problem as it
has been thoroughly discussed. See Carol Stovsky, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.:
Using Copyright Law to Prohibit Unauthorized Use of Computer SoftIvare, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
593 (1995); Michael E. Johnson, The Uncertain Future of Computer Software User's Rights in
the Aftermath of MAI Systems, 44 DuKE L.J. 327 (1994). Further, the language of that section
does not apply to the present question, as it is limited to computer software. Note, however,
that PTO Commissioner, Bruce Lehman, undercut the Working Group's reading of MAI when
at the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions he re-
ferred to § 117 as limiting the scope of copyright protection for transitory copies. See News
from WIPO (Dec. 9, 1996) <http://www.hrrc.orglwr129.html>.
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fixation requirement, other problems exist regarding the present un-
derstanding of fixation. The courts' reliance on the "perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated" language could be interpreted
to apply to the display of a work on a screen regardless of whether a
copy is generated in RAM. A screen display is not the original work,
but merely a display, and it is perceptible, thus meeting the first part
of the definition of fixation. Such an interpretation, however, would
contradict the specific intent of Congress, and would be against any
reasonable interpretation of what constitutes a copy or phonorecord.
50
Even more troublesome is the fact that strict reliance upon the
language the courts relied upon could lead to the illogical conclusion
that a copy of a work stored on a hard drive or other storage media is
not fixed within the meaning of § 101. This is because, under the
courts' interpretation, only the copy of the work located in RAM can
be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated." '51 A copy of
a work stored in a computer storage media such as a hard disk or tape
cannot really be perceived, reproduced, or altered. To do anything
with the copy of a work located on a permanent storage medium, it is
generally necessary to first make a RAM copy, and it is generally
only the RAM copy which is capable of perception, reproduction, or
communication. One may then manipulate the RAM copy and save it
back onto the storage device thus altering the original work. From
the perspective of the copyright owner and the user, however, it is the
copy of a work on permanent storage media which is critical for in-
fringement purposes.12 The copy of a work in RAM is simply a tool
to utilize the permanent work.
The more accurate interpretation of the definition in § 1011 of
what constitutes a "fixed" work is that "perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated" refers to the same matters as that language
in § 102. Section 102 clarifies the meaning of this clause by ap-
pending the language "either directly or with the aid of a machine or
50. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 46.
51. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Advanced Computer Serv. v. MAI
Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.,
1994 WL 446049 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Sega Enters. Ltd, v. MAPHIA, 1996 WL 734409 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
52. The RAM copy could be critical from the copyright owner's perspective, since that is
the copy which allows the user to infringe the copyright. As a practical matter, however, the
limited life of works stored in RAM limits their functionality and thus the damage done to the
copyright owner.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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device." 54 Thus, the definition of "fixed" in § 101 should be read to
incorporate the restrictive language of § 102. This interpretation
would lead to the more logical conclusion that works in a storage
medium, such as a hard drive, are perceivable and reproducible with
the aid of the computer, and are thus fixed for purposes of the Copy-
right Act. Copies of works which reside temporarily in RAM are
simply the means by which the machine makes viewable the work
fixed in another storage medium and are not themselves copies.
This understanding has already been applied at least partially."
Under the present definition, digital works could not qualify as being
"fixed," since they are not inherently perceivable or reproducible.56
The conclusion that a digital work meets the fixation requirement re-
quires that the § 101 definition be modified by the language "either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." The decision in Re-
ligious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv-
ices, Inc.17 supports this interpretation:
Browsing technically causes an infringing copy of the digital in-
formation to be made in the screen memory. MAI holds that such
a copy is fixed even when information is temporarily placed in
RAM, such as the screen RAM. The temporary copying involved
in browsing is only necessary because humans cannot otherwise
perceive digital information. It is the functional equivalent of
reading, which does not implicate the copyright laws and may be
done by anyone without the permission of the copyright owner.58
The court continued to state that even if digital browsing could
somehow be distinguishable, digital browsing still falls within fair
use.
59
The White Paper's recommendations, in conjunction with the
precedent set by the MAI and Triad cases, could upset the traditional
balance between users and copyright owners. If, as the courts have
held and as the Working Group proposes, loading a digital work into
RAM constitutes creation of a copy,6° then users will lose several of
54. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
55. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1378 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
56. Id.
57. Id. But see Sega Enters. Ltd v. MAPHIA, 1996 WL 734409 *7 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
58. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1378 n.25 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
59. Id.
60. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988); Advanced Computer Serv, v. MAI
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the basic privileges copyright law grants them. The Working Group
aptly proposes to expand the distribution right to include digitally
transmitted works.61 However, broadening such rights based on the
assumptions of the Working Group would allow copyright owners
the right to control individual uses or viewings of a work.62
The White Paper proposal blurs the line between browsing and
copying a work. Because all works carried over the Internet must be
downloaded to the searching computer's RAM before viewing,63 it is
possible, under the Working Group's interpretation, to violate a copy-
right owner's rights simply by browsing a work. Traditionally,
viewing a work alone is not enough to violate the copyright owner's
distribution or reproduction rights.r6 Under the Working Group's un-
derstanding, if a user must load a copy into RAM prior to viewing,
browsing a digital work is synonymous with copying the work.65
This would enable copyright owners to circumvent the statutory con-
straints that allow them to prevent only public displays or perform-
ances of a work. Since every performance or display of a work via
the Internet would be a distribution and reproduction in contravention
of the owner's rights, the copyright owner would be able to control
displays or performances of works whether they be public or private.
Another problem is that works must pass through and be stored
in the RAM of various computers which act as servers in order to be
transmitted over the NII.66 The Working Group's proposed adoption
of the MA! line of cases, in combination with its discussion of on-line
service provider liability,67 leads to the conclusion that all such in-
termediary copies would be infringing. This serves no useful pur-
pose, as the copies are actually only temporary. The courts following
MA, however, refuse to look at the actual conditions under which the
copying occurs. Instead, courts look only at the hypothetical situa-
tion that involves loading a copy into RAM and then leaving it
there.68 This approach was properly rejected by the court in Religious
Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E. D. Va. 1994); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co.
1994 WL 446049 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
61. WHrE PAPER , supra note 2, at 193.
62. This is very possible, considering the Working Group's approach to RAM copies and
its reading of the effect of a licensing system on the fair use defense.
63. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1378
n. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
64. Id.
65. WHrm PAPER, supra note 2, at 58.
66. Id. at 59 n. 205.
67. Id. at 117. See infra Part V.
68. Advanced Computer Serv. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va.
1997]
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Technology Center69 and should have been rejected by the Working
Group.70
Some researchers in this area have suggested that a digital
transmission right is not necessary since, at least according to the
Working Group, downloading a work from the Internet would violate
at least one of the copyright owner's other rights.71 However, as the
Working Group points out "[e]ach of the exclusive rights is distinct
and separately alienable and different parties may be responsible for
infringements or licensing of different rights - and different rights
may be owned by different people."7
There is definitely a need for a digital transmission right, but
that right should not encompass loading a work into RAM. No li-
ability should attach to that act if the work is available through a
digital network like the Internet and is viewed by someone. If the
user saves the work to a storage medium, then that would infringe the
copyright owner's reproduction and distribution right. Displaying the
work would also amount to a violation of a copyright owner's public
performance and display rights. This reading of the statute would
also resolve the issue of whether viewing a work privately would be a
violation of the copyright owner's public display or public perform-
ance rights.
III. FAIR USE
The Working Group does not specifically discuss the role of the
fair use defense 73 in the digital environment, but its suggestions for
controlling works through licensing schemes raise some problems
because the Working Group approves American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc.74 This is particularly true when taken in
conjunction with the Working Group's suggestions regarding the
scope of the transmission right and the MA! line of cases. The
district court in Texaco held that a finding of fair use is less likely if
the user could have obtained a license for his particular use of the
1994).
69. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
70. Judging from its proposals, the Working Group apparently does not see this implica-
tion.
71. Pamela Samuelson, The Nl Intellectual Property Report. (National Information In-
frastructure), 37 COMM. orraHE ACM 21 (1994).
72. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 215.
73. Fair use is an affirmative defense to an action for copyright infringement. Wnrrs
PAPER, supra note 2, at 73. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
74. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994).
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work.75 Texaco is not the only case, however, which has reached this
conclusion.76 In fact, the Working Group contradicts this holding in
stating that when the use falls under fair use, "the user is not required
to seek permission from the copyright owner or to pay a license fee
for the use."'  Thus, one reaches the peculiar conclusion from
reading the White Paper that the copier need not pay a license fee
where there is a fair use, but nonpayment of a license fee weighs
against finding fair use.78
The court in Texaco misapplied § 107's first factor, the purpose
and character of the use, in analyzing Texaco's copying ofjournals.79
Section 107 provides in part that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions
of §§ 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work,... for pur-
poses such as... research, is not an infringement of copyright. '80 In
analyzing Texaco's fair use defense, the court failed to give sufficient
weight to the research purposes behind copying the journal articles in
question.8' The majority found that the copies were made for archi-
val purposes even though the articles were of a scientific nature,
published in a scientific journal, and related to the field of expertise
of the researcher.8 2 While the majority was correct in pointing out
that Texaco's employee photocopied the articles and placed them in
his files, the archival nature of this activity was not the ultimate pur-
pose for the articles. 3 Texaco's employee photocopied the articles
and kept them in his files for future reference and never really used
the articles.84 The ultimate purpose of the copies, as the dissent
found, was to facilitate the defendant's research.8
The approach taken by the dissent in emphasizing the ultimate
purpose of the use is in closer accord with the language and purpose
of the Copyright Act.86 One of the primary aims of copyright is to
75. Id. (citing American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc, 802 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
76. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387
(6th Cir. 1996).
77. WHrm PAPER, supra note 2, at 73.
78. This may result in the situation where a user must seek a declaratory judgement that
copying a work is fair prior to reproduction rather than as an after the fact determination.
79. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d at 900.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
81. See generally 37 F.3d at 881.
82. Id.
83. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 890 (2d Cir. 1994).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 900.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
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promote creativity by providing an incentive to publish new works of
research and to extend upon the works of others. 7 By only consid-
ering the specific instance of copying without examining the under-
lying purpose, the court in Texaco sets a precedent that stifles new
research based on those works.
Where the purpose for copying the work is one of the purposes
enumerated in § 107, as was the case in Texaco, there is a strong pre-
sumption that the first factor in a fair use analysis favors the defen-
dant.88 The Second Circuit's inaccurate analysis of the purpose and
character of the use resulted in its finding the first factor in favor of
the copyright holder.
The court also distinguished Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States improperly. 9 In rejecting Texaco's argument that the copying
was "reasonable and customary," the Second Circuit stated:
"[W]hatever validity this argument might have had before the advent
of the photocopying licensing arrangements (of the CCC), the argu-
ment today is insubstantial." 9° The court interpreted the holding in
Williams & Wilkins as depending on the lack of a licensing scheme.9
Commentators, however, have criticized this interpretation of Wil-
liams & Wilkins as creating a broad expansion of the copyright mo-
nopoly.
The advent of a program for photocopying licensing is not a valid
distinction, however, because the lack of a way to collect payment
for copies was not the reason that photocopying was "reasonable"
in Williams & Wilkins. The Court of Claims cited many fac-
tors .... [I]t did not consider the lack of availability of a licensing
scheme to be relevant to the inquiry of fair use and only addressed
the issue as a response to the plaintiffs assertion that licensing
should be relevant.92
The Working Group further relies on a questionable reading of
the relevant case law by failing to acknowledge the effect of Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.93 The White Paper references
the Sony decision for the proposition that all commercial uses are
87. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,201 (1953).
88. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991).
89. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. CI. 1973), aff'd,
420 U.S. 376 (1976).
90. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 892 (2d Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 899.
92. Karen L. Still, Note, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco. Inc.: Expanding the
Copyright Monopoly, 29 GA. L. REv. 1233, 1255-56 (1995).
93. See generally Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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presumably unfair.94 While this is a correct interpretation of the
holding in Sony, it fails to mention that the presumption is the oppo-
site when the conduct is noncommercial or nonprofit.95
The White Paper further misstates the effect of Sony in footnote
229.96 It states, "[a]s an affirmative defense, the burdens of persua-
sion and coming forward with evidence both must be carried by de-
fendants to avoid liability."97 The Court in Sony, however, stated that
while this is generally true, it is not so in all cases. The Court spe-
cifically states that, if the intended use is for commercial gain, the
likelihood of future harm "may be presumed," but that "if it is for a
noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated. 98
Thus, where analysis under § 107(1) results in a finding that the pur-
pose or character of the use is noncommercial, the copyright owner
must carry the burden of proof with regard to § 107(4).
The White Paper's misreading of Sony could have the effect of
greatly expanding the copyright owner's monopoly. By ignoring the
presumption that noncommercial uses are fair, and failing to shift the
burden of proof where the use is noncommercial in nature, the
Working Group places a much heavier burden on defendants to prove
fair use. This expansion of the copyright monopoly together with the
Working Group's adoption of Texaco decision could erode the fair
use defense for digital works.
By undermining the fair use defense, the White Paper contra-
dicts the basic purposes of the Copyright Act. The overriding goal of
the Copyright Clause is the promotion of the useful arts and sci-
ences.99 Furthering that goal requires both that authors and inventors
94. White Paper, supra note 2.
95. Id. at 449 (explaining that "[l]fthe Betamax were used to make copies for a commer-
cial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair... [t]he contrary pre-
sumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court's findings plainly estab-
lished that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized as a noncommercial,
nonprofit activity").
96. Id.
97. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 48.
98. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 451 (Stating that where the
use of a work is commercial the copyright owner is entitled to a presumption of illegality and
the infringer bears the burden of proving a lack of economic harm. Where, however, the use is
noncommercial in nature the owner must prove "either that the particular use is harmful or that
if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copy-
righted work.').
99. "The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Consti-
tution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings... but upon the
ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts
promoted." S. REP. No. 60-1108, at 7 (1909).
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have an incentive to create and that users have access to any resulting
works. Thus, while copyright protection provides an incentive for
authors to create works, the fair use defense prevents the copyright
monopoly from becoming a restriction on the use of knowledge by
those who might add to it. Out of this tension between the need to
provide authors with an incentive to create works and the need to
preserve the users' right to access those works, the courts have cre-
ated a balance through the Copyright Act that protects the author only
to the extent necessary to provide an incentive. Under this formula,
the copyright owner has no rights beyond those strictly necessary as
an incentive for creation.
The Working Group, however, gives copyright owners substan-
tially more control over their works than is necessary to provide this
incentive. By adopting the fair use analysis of Texaco and ignoring
the presumptions set forth in Sony, the Working Group extends the
copyright monopoly beyond the scope intended by the Copyright
Clause. The creation of new technology or a new market which
could result in larger profits for copyright owners, i.e., the Copyright
Clearance Center, does not justify the expansion of the copyright
monopoly and the concomitant restriction of access rights. This is
because the incentive to create new works already exists within pres-
ent technology and markets.
It is conceivable that a new technology would lend itself to a li-
censing scheme that permits no use of a work without a royalty pay-
ment to the copyright owner."° This is particularly true of digital
works which are easily manipulable.10 In that situation, eliminating
the fair use defense would contradict the Copyright Clause, because it
would fail to allow for use without payment to the copyright owner,
now matter how small the amount of use.
In expanding the copyright monopoly, the Working Group failed
to take into account the incentives for creation already exist. The po-
100. In fact, from a close reading of the White Paper, this author gets the feeling that the
Working Group may have been imagining just this situation. See generally WHITE PAPER, su-
pra note 2.
101. Because digital works exist only as a stream of undifferentiated bits, it is a simple
matter to remove infinitely small sections of a single work. One could easily take a particular
background from a digitized photograph, combine it with a sentence or two of text from a
digital writing, and insert a short sequence of sound from a song, to create a new multimedia
work. It is also fairly easy in a digital context to monitor which parts of the data stream have
been sampled and then charge a license fee for only those parts. INFORMATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TASK FORCE, GREEN PAPER: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA-
sTRUCTURE: A PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 106-107 (1995).
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sition that licensing revenues are necessary when sufficient incen-
tives for the creation of new works already exist is untenable.102 The
White Paper nonetheless takes this position.
IV. FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
One of the most perplexing arguments made by the Working
Group concerns the first sale doctrine. White Paper's understanding
of the first sale doctrine eliminates the first sale right for works that
are digitally transmitted.
[T]he first sale doctrine limits only the copyright owner's distribu-
tion right; it in no way affects the reproduction right. Thus, the
first sale doctrine does not allow the transmission of a copy of a
work (through a computer network, for instance), because, under
current technology the transmitter retains the original copy of the
work while the recipient of the transmission obtains a reproduction
of the original copy (i.e., a new copy), rather than the copy owned
by the transmitter.'03
This assumes, however, that the "current technology" is the only
method available of reproducing a copy of the original. This is an
unsafe assumption. It is no more difficult technologically to have the
transmission protocol remove the original work in the process of
transmitting it. The Working Group realized that such a technologi-
cal fix would solve the problem and would not create an infringing
copy. "[I]f the technology utilized allows the transmission of a copy
without making an unlawful reproduction- i.e., no copy remains
with the original owner -the first sale doctrine would apply and the
transmission would not be an infringement."' 1 4
Granted that allowing first sale rights in transmissions may in
some instances result in the copying of the work, that does not suffi-
ciently justify doing away with the rights granted by the first sale
doctrine. If the only protection for a copyright owner from the prob-
lem articulated above is the removal of the original copy by the
transmission protocol, there exists a substantial probability of abuse
of the system by the user. The user in some cases could simply pre-
pare a copy of the copyrighted work prior to transmission, and
achieve the very condition that the White Paper is trying to solve
102. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding no
right to additional revenues for home taping market where sufficient incentive to create exists
in present markets).
103. WHrra PAPER, supra note 2, at 92.
104. Id. at 93.
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the existence of two copies of a work, one on the originating com-
puter and one on the receiving. Nonetheless, since duplicating or
copying the original violates the reproduction right, the copyright
holder would not lose any rights while the user retains the first sale
exception.
The technological solution of automatic deletion also creates
several conundrums of its own. Where the underlying work that is to
be transmitted is within the public domain, the fact that the transmis-
sion protocol automatically deletes the originating file would under-
mine the very purpose for transmission in the first place, i.e., unlim-
ited transferability. Deleting the originating file would also be
awkward where one is trying to send e-mail or another work of one's
own creation. These problems may be relatively easy to solve.
If the Working Group succeeds in having all copyrighted works
carry an embedded copyright management information block, then a
user could simply have the transmission protocol read the copyright
management information embedded in the work to determine
whether the work was licensed for transmission without deletion. If
the copyright management information states that the work is public
domain or that there are no transmission restrictions, then the trans-
mission protocol would send the work without deleting it. If the
work was licensed only for use on an individual machine, then the
transmission protocol will delete the originating work in the process
of transmission. Another solution, of course, would be to follow the
procedures outlined above for violating the copyright while transmit-
ting a work. The end result would be the same, both the sending and
receiving machine would have copies of the work.
The Working Group's analysis also leads to another unique con-
clusion that works that a user obtains digitally come with fewer rights
than the identical work in a physical form. If the first sale rights do
not cover transmission, then the digital work is much more restricted
than the physical form of the same work. For example, compare two
copies of a book. One is purchased on-line over the Internet, the
other at a bookstore. Although they are exactly the same work, the
person who purchased the digital version has substantially fewer
rights. The owner of the physical book may sell, lease, or otherwise
transfer the book to a third party. The owner of the digital book,
however, cannot transfer it, unless she does so as part of the sale of
the computer or storage medium in which it resides." 5 Because the
105. Id.at 92.
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work was purchased digitally there is no physical form to transfer,
unlike situations involving the purchase of a program on disk. At
least in the second case, one can transfer the original disks. The
Working Group's analysis thus creates a dubious distinction, giving
more rights to one copy of a work than another based on the form of
fixation of the work.
The Working Group recognizes one exception where digitally
transmitted works are transferrable within the first sale right. If the
work was fixed in a removable media when the user originally
downloaded it, then the user could sell a copy of the work on disk."0 6
This, however, permits only a very restricted first sale exception.
Thus, the Working Group has managed to significantly restrict the
first sale doctrine while explicitly rejecting any restrictions.
The Working Group rejects what may be a viable solution to the
first sale dilemma. The Working Group cites § 109 for the limited
first sale exception with regards to computer programs and phonore-
cords of sound recordings.107 The Working Group, however, refuses
to extend the limited first sale fights that apply to those works to
works which are digitally transmitted. The Working Group refuses to
do so in spite of the fact that the reasoning behind the limited first
sale exception for computer software and sound recordings applies
equally to digitally transmitted works."0 ' The Copyright Act specifi-
cally limits the first sale doctrine with regard to those works because
of the ease with which one can make copies or phonorecords of the
work.109 This same analysis would apply to digital works. If the rea-
soning is the same for the different mediums, then the law should
treat them all equally and recognize first sale rights for digital works,
except where they are rented, leased, or lent for direct or indirect
commercial advantage. This, of course, assumes that the user follows
one of the technological solutions suggested above so that it does not
infringe the copyright owner's reproduction right.
106. Id. at 93 ("It has been suggested that the scope of the first sale doctrine be narrowed
to exclude copies obtained via transmission. This would mean, for instance, that if a copy of a
literary work is legally purchased on-line and the copy so purchased is downloaded onto the
purchaser's disk, the disk could not be resold. Clearly, the first sale doctrine should apply if
the particular copy involved is in fact the copy that is further distributed.").
107. Id. at 81.
108. Digital works like computer programs and sound recordings are easily and infinitely
reproducible at approximately the same quality as the original work. K. Corsello, The Com-
puter Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990: Another Bend in the First Sale Doctrine, 41
CATm. U. L. RP . 177, 192 (1991).
109. 17U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1988).
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The White Paper proposal also runs afoul of the public policy
against restrictions on the alienation of property rights."' The White
Paper's dismissal of the first sale exception creates almost a complete
ban on the alienation of digitally transmitted works. It further gives
the copyright owner a right which she has never had before - the
right to every sale of a work. Because an owner of a digital copy of a
work is practically barred from transferring that copy, any new users
must purchase their copy of the work directly from the author. This
results in a tidy profit for the copyright owner, but it does not com-
port with copyright principles.
V. ON-LINE SERVICE PROVIDER LIABILITY
The Working Group briefly considers the liability of service
providers"' for copyright infringements by users of the service"2 and
comes down in favor of the service provider being directly liable for
actions by users on the service so long as the service provider has any
level of control over access to the content of its servers."' This takes
one view of the law in this area and ignores all others."4 Given the
increased criminal and civil penalties the White Paper articulates, to
hold on-line service providers (OSPs) directly liable for infringe-
ments of which they had no knowledge and over which they had little
or no control is unnecessary.
The White Paper argues for direct liability by analogy to the li-
ability the law imposes on other service providers and retailers." 5
[B]ook sellers, record stores, newsstands and computer software
retailers cannot possibly read all the books, listen to all the records,
review all the newspapers and magazines or analyze all the corn-
110. Peters, supra note 3, at 355 (arguing that "[t]he first sale doctrine was developed to
avoid restraints on the alienation of physical property, and to prevent publishers from control-
ling not only initial sales of books, but the after-market for resales," and that, "[t]hese concerns
do not apply to transmissions of works on the NIl"). There is, however, no basis for arguing
that the policy against restraints on alienation apply only to physical works. The economic
justifications for the first sale right exist in any valuable work whether digital or physical.
111. The term "service providers" includes both on-line service providers (OSPs) and In-
ternet service providers (ISPs).
112. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 117.
113. Id. at123.
114. Religious Tech Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (rejecting direct liability for an online service provider). See also Sega Enters., Ltd.
v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996). But see Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.
Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal.
1994).
115. WHrrE PAPEa, supra note 2, at 117.
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puter programs that pass through their establishments for possible
infringements. Yet, they may be held strictly liable as distributors
if the works or copies they deal in are infringing.116
The Working Group also makes the analogy to publishers. "On-
line service providers currently provide a number of services. With
respect to the allowance of uploading of material by their subscribers,
they are, in essence, acting as an electronic publisher."'1 7 Both of
these analogies are fundamentally flawed. The Working Group ig-
nores the fact that, in all of its analogies, the service provider, re-
tailer, or publisher receives the works for which they are liable from
known, primarily commercial, sources.118 Furthermore, as they are in
the business of selling products in a particular market, one can expect
publishers to know if they are selling infringing goods. An example
of this is the commercial bookseller. A commercial bookseller will
purchase its stock directly from specific publishers. In addition, the
bookseller only deals in the sale of books, and for the most part does
not sell other copyrightable works. The bookseller thus has the ad-
vantage of being able to rely on the reputation of the publishers with
which they deal, and need only be aware of the copyrights on a lim-
ited number of products. The same is not true for on-line service
providers.
On-line service providers generally do not get their works from
commercial sources that can be expected to comply with copyright
law as a means of preserving their business. OSPs do not obtain their
works in the sense that retailers or publishers do. An OSP merely
provides the system, and a majority of the content is placed there in
gratis by individuals. Individuals will upload works without any no-
tice to the service provider and the works will run the gamut in terms
of the Section 102(a) categories of works. A subscriber to a particu-
lar service provider could be uploading a book, a computer program,
a sound file, or almost anything else. The situation is very different
from that of the commercial retailer, who generally deals in one area
of goods. It would be impossible for an OSP to be aware of all of the
copyrights in the different types of works which are uploaded on a
daily basis. The analogies offered by the Working Group simply do
not hold. Service providers have no way of ensuring that they are not
indirectly contributing to the infringement of a copyrighted work.
A better analogy would be to the owner of a lot or building that
116. Id.at75.
117. Id.at79.
118. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2.
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holds a swap meet.n 9 The owner may have some control over who is
able to sell on their lot but has very little control over what goods the
participants sell. In fact, the owner probably will not even know
what individual vendors sell. The participants are in charge of pro-
moting or selling their goods, not the owner. It is simply not feasible
for our theoretical owner to monitor all of the goods that participants
bring to his property for compliance with copyright laws. 120
The Working Group also looks to prior case law to support its
recommendation that on-line service providers be directly liable for
copyright infringement by its subscribers.' The Working Group
specifically cites Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena (Playboy)" and
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPNL4 (Sega 1 ).11 Once again, the White
Paper excludes case law supporting the opposite conclusion. The
court in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communi-
cation Services, Inc. (Netcom) considered Playboy and Sega I, and
the White Paper in rejecting direct liability for an OSP. 124 The Net-
corn decision is supported by cases involving service provider liabil-
ity for defamation."z The court in Netcom thought that, "[a]lthough
copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some ele-
ment of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's
system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.' 26 The court
explained that "Netcom's act of designing and implementing a sys-
tem that automatically and uniformly creates temporary copies of all
data sent through it is not unlike that of the owner of a copying ma-
chine who lets the public make copies with it."'27 According to the
court, "athough some people using the machine may directly infringe
copyrights, courts analyze the machine owner's liability under the
119. Fonovisa, Inc., v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding owner
of a swap meet liable for contributory infringement). However, Fonovisa is distinguishable as
Cherry Auction had prior notice on several occasions of the infringing activity.
120. Cf Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 927-29 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(finding the defendants, Maphia, guilty of infringement, based on the analysis, but only be-
cause of extraordinary evidence that the defendants knew of the infringement, including print-
outs from the system operator's computer showing the system operator know that users were
uploading and downloading unauthorized copies of Sega's copyrighted video games).
121. WHrrEPAPR, supra note 2, at 120-21.
122. Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
123. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
124. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm, Serv., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
125. See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); but see
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (1995).
126. Religious Tech. Ctr., 923 F. Supp. at 1370.
127. Id. at 1369.
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rubric of contributory infringement, not direct infringement."' 28 The
court in Sega, which the Working Group relies upon, has reconsid-
ered the question and has adopted the analysis put forth by the court
in Netcom.129
Where there is no causal relationship between a service pro-
vider's conduct and the infringement by a third party, the analysis re-
garding the service provider should be limited to contributory and not
direct infringement.3 0 This approach is more consistent with the ac-
tual control exercised by OSPs. It has the additional benefit of pro-
viding some level of certainty for OSPs as to when they are infring-
ing. Under the direct liability scheme, the OSP would have no
knowledge that they were infringing until someone takes them to
court, at which point the OSP has little chance at defending itself,
given the broad range of conduct courts have held to be sufficient
control for purposes of direct liability.
Throughout the White Paper, the Working Group argues that
where new technology has made it easier to infringe a copyrighted
work, the copyright monopoly should be enlarged to compensate.
The corollary to that argument should be true as well, that where new
technology has made it easier to police copyright infringement, the
copyright monopoly should be limited. The White Paper contains no
such provision,'3' despite the fact that, while digital technology may
benefit the infringer by making copying easier, it also benefits the
copyright owner by increasing its ability to monitor copyright viola-
tions. With the expansion of digital technology and, in particular,
search engines on the Internet, copyright owners have a new tool to
enforce their rights.
In the past, direct liability was necessary, because there was no
economical way for copyright owners to monitor their works and be
sure that no one was infringing. This is no longer true with digital
technology. A combination of the White Paper's suggested copyright
128. Id. (citing RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)); 3
Nnirm, supra note 10, § 12.04[A][2][b]; Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dia-
logue on the Information Superhiway: The Case Against Copyright Liabilityfor Bulletin Board
Operators, 13 CA~wozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 345, 390 (1995) (arguing that contributory infringe-
ment is more appropriate for dealing with BBS liability, first, because it focuses attention on
the BBS-users relationship and the way imposing liability on BBS operators may shape this
relationship, and second because it better addresses the complexity of the relationship between
BBS operators and subscribers).
129. Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 924, *8 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
130. Religious Tech. Cir., 923 F. Supp. at 1370.
131. The only restriction on a copyright owner's rights is the grant of a license for repro-
ducing or adapting works for the visually impaired. WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 227-28.
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management information or steganography and digital search engines
enables the copyright owner to police their own works. The copy-
right owner can easily create digital watermarks or other identifying
marks in its digital works which they could then use as the search
criteria. This is in fact what is happening presently, despite the
Working Group's reluctance to realize it. In a digital environment
like the Internet, where works can be located by simply searching, it
is incumbent on the copyright owner to search for infringing copies
of its works, and to inform the system on which they reside that they
are in violation of the Copyright Act. This process has the additional
benefit of being automatable, minimizing the response time from a
copyright owner and preventing the spread of illicit copies of the
work.
An approach combining stenography and digital search engines
has several benefits which contributory liability cannot claim and
which a direct liability system cannot replicate. By placing at least
some of the burden of preventing copyright infringement on the party
which benefits from strict copyright enforcement, it creates an incen-
tive for the copyright owner to actively employ self-help rather than
judicial remedies. Placing a portion of the burden on the copyright
owner also makes the task of ensuring copyright compliance easier.
The copyright owner has only a limited number of works which it
must monitor, as opposed to the OSP who would have to monitor
every work on its system. The copyright owner is also in a position
to place signifying characteristics into its digital works through
steganography, which would ease the task of locating infringing
works. Of course, once the copyright owner has found an infringing
copy of one of their works and informed the service provider of its
existence, the burden shifts to the service provider to remedy the in-
fringement. The service provider's refusal to remove infringing
copies of a work from their system may subject them to willful in-
fringement remedies.' Regardless of whether the copyright owner
can recover willful infringement damages, notifying the service pro-
vider of the infringement will allow the owner to recover for con-
tributory infringement. This results in a much more certain place-
ment of liability than does direct liability. 33
132. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1988).
133. This is in fact the approach recently taken by the PTO in suggesting a resolution to
this question to Senator Moorehead. Memorandum from Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, to Congressman Carlos
Moorhead, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (10/10/96)(on file with the Santa Clara
Computer and High Technology Law Journal).
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The prior suggested approach can be enhanced even more by
adding a provision requiring that service providers adopt and imple-
ment a procedure for searching their own system for copyright in-
fringements. A service provider's failure to implement any such pro-
cedure could be a factor weighing heavily in favor of holding the
service provider contributorily liable if the service provider had no
notice or willful infringement damages if it had notice. This is un-
tenable to OSPs under the present approach to liability because af-
firmatively seeking out and removing infringements on their own
could render them liable for infringement on any works they missed.
However, by providing a system of notice prior to the attachment of
liability, the OSPs are then in a position to work together with copy-
right owners to prevent copyright infringement. This dual approach
provides an incentive for both the copyright owner and the service
provider to make an effort to combat copyright violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Working Group's proposals have created significant
controversy, they have so far failed to result in any substantive legis-
lation. The two bills introduced into Congress last session as a result
of the Working Group's proposal, H.R. 2441 and S. 1284, failed to
pass, as they never left the respective subcommittees prior to the end
of the 104th Congress.'34 Two provisions of the White Paper were
enacted, however, during the last congressional session. Congress
included in the Library of Congress appropriations bill a provision
allowing the publication of materials for the visually impaired, pro-
vided the copyright owner was given one year from the original pub-
lication date to create a visually impaired edition of the work.' 35
Congress also passed the Performing Rights in Sound Recordings
Act.'36 This Act provides a new right for producers and performers
for certain digital transmissions, in addition to the public perform-
ance right already enjoyed by the composer in the underlying compo-
sition.13 7
That H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 (the NI bills) did not pass does not
sound the death knell for the present push for protection of transmis-
sions. The NII bills were held up in large part due to the opposition
134. H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1996).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 121 (1997).
136. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.104-39, 109
Stat. 336 (1995)
137. See generally id.
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of OSPs and Internet access providers (ISPs).138 They objected to the
bills' failure to clarify that OSPs and ISPs were not directly liable for
infringing activity on their systems.'39 This was only one of several
battles that went on over the passage of the NII bills, but it was the
primary battle during the 104th Congress. 4 ° The bills also drew op-
position from library groups objecting to the fair use provisions for
libraries and a coalition of groups objecting to the proposed ban on
devices intended to defeat anti-copying measures. 141
When Congress reconvenes for its 105th session, the on-line
service providers may have fewer objections to the NI bills. The NII
bills, as introduced in the 105th Congress, will in all probability
contain language providing a safe harbor provision for service and
access providers as well as a specific mere conduit exception to li-
ability. These provisions are the result of a new proposal made by
the PTO in a letter dated October 4, 1996.141
The new proposal, which should form the basis of any further
discussion, provides for the amendment of the Copyright Act to in-
clude a new section, 17 U.S.C. § 512.143 Section 512 has a specific
safe harbor provision that disallows holding service providers con-
tributorily or vicariously liable for infringement occurring on their
system unless the copyright owner provides notice meeting the re-
quirements of subsection 3 of that section.'" Paragraph 3 requires
notifications to: (a) be signed, physically or electronically, (b) iden-
138. NH Copyright Bill Likely Dead for the Year, COMM. TODAY, 1996 WL 10161538 at *1
(1996).
139. Id at*2.
140. Id
141. Action on NH Copyright Bill Postponed Indefinitely, WST'S LEGAL NEWS, 1996 WL
330284 at *1 (1996).
142. Memorandum from Bruce A. Lehman, supra note 133.
143. Action on NI Copyright Bill, supra note 141, at *2.
144. Section 512 provides, in relevant part:
(1) ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO NOTICE. - When a service provider or agent
thereof designated pursuant to paragraph (5), receives a notification, filed in ac-
cordance with the requirements of paragraph (3), of a claim of copyright in-
fringement with respect to material, for which it is technically feasible and eco-
nomically reasonable for the service provider to disable or block access to or
remove, if that service provider responds as expeditiously as possible afier re-
ceiving such notification, by disabling or blocking access to or removing the
material claimed to be infringing such that the material cannot be accessed
through the service provider's system or network, then such service provider
shall not be vicariously liable for the infringement of another person or liable
for contributory infringement relating to the infringement described in such no-
tification.
Memorandum from Bruce A. Lehman, supra note 133.
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tify the particular copyrighted work or works and the right infringed,
(c) describe the material claimed to be infringing, (d) include infor-
mation sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the com-
plaining party, (e) state that the complaining party has a good faith
belief that use of the material is not authorized, and (f) state that the
information in the notification is accurate. 41 The proposal also pro-
tects service providers from liability for any acts they do in compli-
ance with a notification that there is a work on their system which in-
fringes a copyright.' 46 Finally, § 512(b) provides for an explicit
exception to liability for service providers that are mere conduits for
copyright violations or for infringement which arises solely out of
supplying electronic mail or real-time communication services.
1 47
The NII bills in the 105th Congress, if they reflect the October
4th PTO proposal, should see substantially less opposition than did
their predecessors. Clearly, the inclusion of the proposed § 512 only
solves one of the many problems with the White Paper. It does not
address the Working Group's one-sided reading of the state of copy-
right law. Congress will do well to learn from the MA4 decisions,
and not simply adopt the Working Group's proposals without com-
ment, as it did with the CONTU report. Any such adoption of the
Working Group's White Paper would result in a substantial shift in
the law, lending congressional support to one side of a split in the
circuits. It would also behoove Congress to take into consideration
the recent holdings in Neteom and Sega II.
The fate of copyright law on the Internet does not depend solely
upon congressional action. The World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (WIPO) has recently broached the issue of what copyright
protection should be available to digital works on the Internet. 141 De-
spite the support of the United States' delegation, the conference did
not adopt proposed Article 7, which would have specifically clarified
that temporary copies were within the reproduction right of Article 9
145. Id.
146. (6) LIMITATION ON OTHER LIABILITY. - A service provider shall not be liable
to any person for any claim based on the service provider's good faith disabling or blocking of
access to or removal of material claimed to be infringing to the procedures established in this
subsection, regardless of whether the material is ultimately determined to be infringing.
Memorandum from Bruce A. Lehman, supra note 133, at *3.
147. Memorandum from Bruce A. Lehman, supra note 133.
148. WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Ques-
tions, Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Con-
ceming the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to be Considered by the Diplomatic Con-
ference (Aug. 30, 1996) <http://www.org.eng.diplconf/4dc_all.htm>.
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of the Berne Convention.'49 The U.S. delegation, however, was able
to include an agreed statement concerning the protection of transitory
copies under the WIPO Copyright Treaty. i"0 Because the WIPO
Copyright Treaty does not alter our international agreements,' it is
uncertain whether it will have any influence on similar provisions in
our own legislation. The significant resistance which the WIPO pro-
posal received may very well carry over to congressional discussion
of the scope of copyright protection. If the last session is any indica-
tion, it is doubtful that there will be that much resistance to the exten-
sion of the MAI approach to digital networks. There is, however, a
collateral attack underway against the precedent established by MAI.
There is a bill presently before Congress which would reverse the
MAI court's finding that loading software into a computer's RAM
while servicing the machine constitutes a violation of copyright. 5 2
It is always possible that Congress will decide to take the
Working Group at its word that copyright law presently covers most
of the issues raised by digital networks without any alterations, but it
is doubtful. When Congress gets around to reintroducing the copy-
right NII legislation, it will probably look at least fairly similar to the
bills that were before the 104th Congress. Last year's battles have
proven that the Working Group may not have the consensus it
149. Article 7 as originally proposed provided:
(1) The exclusive right accorded to authors of literary and artistic works in Ar-
ticle 9(1) of the Berne Convention of authorizing the reproduction of their
works shall include direct and indirect reproduction of their works, whether
permanent or temporary, in any manner or form.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, it shall be
a matter for legislation in Contracting Parties to limit the right of reproduction
in cases where a temporary reproduction has the sole purpose of making the
work perceptible or where the reproduction is of a transient or incidental nature,
provided that such reproduction takes place in the course of use of the work that
is authorized by the author or permitted by law.
WIPO Diplomatic Conference, supra note 148.
150. WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Ques-
tions, Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty (Dec. 23, 1996)
<http://www.wipo.orgleng/diplconf/distrib/96dclhtm> ('The reproduction right, as set out in
Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the exceptions permitted thereunder, fully apply in the
digital environment, in particular to the use of works in digital form."). It is agreed that the
storage of a protected work in digital form in an electronic medium constitutes a reproduction
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne. Id.
151. Since the language added to the WIPO Copyright Treaty only states the applicability
of Article 9 of Berne to digital works it should not require any changes to our law. WIPO
Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, WIPO Copy-
right Treaty (Dec. 23, 1996) <http:/lwipo.orglengldiplconf/94dc.htm>.
152. H.R. 72, 105th Cong. (1997).
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thought it had. The rebirth of the bills for the 105th Congress can be
expected to contain language at least very similar to that contained in
the amended ISP provisions. The new bills may also manifest a re-
treat from the position taken by the courts in MAI and its progeny.
Unfortunately, it looks like the libraries will be in for yet another
battle on the question of fair use and, if the last session is any exam-
ple, the Working Group's approach to first sale rights will be ac-
cepted without comment. The touchy issue for the 105th Congress
may be the White Paper proposals regarding copyright management
information and importation of anti-copying devices.153 There has
been substantial resistance to these provisions, but they gained inter-
national acceptance with the passing of Articles 11 and 12 of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty."'
Regardless of the form of the bills as they are introduced in the
105th Congress, it will be incumbent on practitioners to advocate
keeping the amendments consistent with the original balance set by
the Constitution and to prevent the creation of a digital world out of
balance.
153. WzrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 207.
154. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 150.
1997] 573

